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Abstract 
Introduction: Uganda is in discussions to introduce a national health insurance scheme. However, there is a paucity 
of information on household preferences and willingness to pay for health insurance attributes that may guide the 
design of an acceptable health insurance scheme. Our study sought to assess household preferences and willingness 
to pay for health insurance in Kampala city using a discrete choice experiment.
Methods: This study was conducted from 16th February 2020 to 10th April 2020 on 240 households in the Kawempe 
division of Kampala city stratified into slum and non-slum communities in order to get a representative sample of 
the area. We purposively selected the communities that represented slum and non-slum communities and thereaf-
ter applied systematic sampling in the selection of the households that participated in the study from each of the 
communities. Four household and policy-relevant attributes were used in the experimental design of the study. Each 
respondent attended to 9 binary choice sets of health insurance plans that included one fixed choice set. Data were 
analyzed using mixed logit models.
Results: Households in both the non-slum and slum communities had a high preference for health insurance 
plans that included both private and public health care providers as compared to plans that included public health 
care providers only (non-slum coefficient β = 0.81, P < 0.05; slum β = 0.87, p < 0.05) and; health insurance plans that 
covered extended family members as compared to plans that had limitations on the number of family members 
allowed (non-slum β = 0.44, P < 0.05; slum β = 0.36, p < 0.05). Households in non-slum communities, in particular, had 
a high preference for health insurance plans that covered chronic illnesses and major surgeries to other plans (0.97 
β, P < 0.05). Our findings suggest that location of the household influences willingness to pay with households from 
non-slum communities willing to pay more for the preferred attributes.
Conclusion: Potential health insurance schemes should consider including both private and public health care 
providers and allow more household members to be enrolled in both slum and non-slum communities. However, the 
inclusion of more HH members should be weighed against the possible depletion of resources and other attributes. 
Potential health insurance schemes should also prioritize coverage for chronic illnesses and major surgeries in non-
slum communities, in particular, to make the scheme attractive and acceptable for these communities.
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Introduction
According to the sustainable development goal 3, tar-
get 8, member countries of the United Nations agreed 
to achieve universal health coverage (UHC) including: 
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financial risk protection; access to quality essential health 
care services and; access to safe, effective, quality, and 
affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all by 
2030 [1]. Low and middle-income countries face chal-
lenges in achieving UHC due to limited public resources, 
inefficient resource allocation, reliance on out-of-pocket 
(OOP) expenditures, and large population sizes [2]. For 
example, the current health expenditure as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) for sub-Saharan Africa 
is estimated at 5.2%, which is almost 50% lower than the 
global average (9.9%). In Uganda, the health expenditure 
as a share of the national GDP is almost 70% and 50% 
lower than the estimates for North America (16.6%) and 
the European Union (9.9%), respectively [3]. The Uganda 
government’s health expenditure as a share of its GDP 
and its health expenditure per capita are estimated at 
0.97% and USD (United States dollars) 38.4, respectively. 
These estimates are less than the Working Group on 
Health Financing’s recommended health sectors’ share of 
GDP and health expenditure per capita that are expected 
to be at least 5% and USD 86, respectively [3–5].
The lower health sector’s share of the national GDP 
in Uganda indicates inadequacies in health financ-
ing, which may explain why 40% of the country’s health 
expenditure is OOP expenditure. The OOP expenditures 
in Uganda are two times higher than the World Health 
Organization (WHO)’s recommendation of 20% of the 
total health expenditure in a country [2, 4, 5]. This calls 
for more financial risk protection for the HHs in Uganda 
to protect them against OOP expenditures and their con-
sequences (catastrophic health expenditure and impover-
ishment) [2]. Taxes and health insurance are the means 
recommended by the WHO to raise funds for the health 
sector in low and middle-income countries in order to 
achieve UHC (including financial risk protection) [2, 6]. 
Taxes and health insurance have shown good results in 
other African countries such as Ghana and Rwanda pro-
viding increased financial risk protection and increased 
service utilization [7, 8].
Uganda is in discussions to introduce a National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in order to reduce OOP 
expenditures and raise adequate funds for its health sec-
tor [9]. The existing health insurance schemes in the 
country are mainly provided by the private sector and 
contribute less than 3% of the total health financing in 
the country and are often accessed by those in formal 
employment [5]. There has been some success with com-
munity health insurance schemes that usually target rural 
communities––indicating the communities’ interest 
in saving for health. However, these community health 
insurance schemes are usually based on subscription 
membership fees that are often low and cannot cover 
long hospitalizations and severe illnesses [10, 11].
A successful NHIS requires a scheme that has been 
well thought out and that reflects HHs’ preferences. In 
this study, we assessed HHs’ preferences and WTP for 
health insurance. Specifically, we focused on: (1) identify-
ing differences between the HHs in slum and non-slum 
communities that may influence their choice of health 
insurance plan; (2) determining preferences for the 
attributes of health insurance by HHs and; (3) estimating 
WTP for health insurance by HHs. We applied a discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) approach that is different from 
the contingent valuation methods used in the prior stud-
ies conducted in Uganda. Contingent valuation methods 
can assess the total value of a commodity including the 
passive-use value but cannot determine the importance 
and the value HHs attach to the health insurance attrib-
utes [12–15]. Understanding the importance and value 
HHs attach to the different attributes of health insurance 
is critical in informing the design of an acceptable health 
insurance scheme [16–18].
Methods
Study design and study area
This was a DCE that was conducted from 16th February 
2020 to 10th April 2020 in two parishes of the Kawempe 
division of Kampala capital city of Uganda. The Katanga 
slum represented the slum communities, while the Kye-
bando parish represented the non-slum communities in 
Kampala [19]. We chose this study setting because Kam-
pala is the most populous urban center in the country 
with over 1.5 million people (31% of the urban population 
in the country); has more public and private health care 
facilities including several specialized public health care 
facilities compared with any other district in the country 
and; has a representation of the many tribes from all over 
the country [20–22]. We decided to stratify the study 
area into slum and non-slum communities in order to get 
a representative sample of the City, which has over 60% 
of the population living in slums [23]. Finally, we chose 
to conduct the study in the Kawempe division because 
of budget constraints and because we assumed that the 
population in the City is mainly divided into slum and 
non-slum dwellers. Figure 1 describes the study design.
Development of the DCE
Choosing attributes and levels
In line with recommendations, a two-stage approach 
was used to generate attributes and levels [24–28]. First, 
conceptual attributes were identified from the literature 
and policy documents. We identified over 20 attrib-
utes from the literature review. The candidate attributes 
from the literature review that were relevant to Uganda 
included: premiums; the unit of enrollment; the type 
of health care providers; the service benefits package 
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and; the copayment levels [9, 16, 29–35]. These candi-
date attributes were used to guide the design of the FGD 
guide (Additional file 1). Second, four focused group dis-
cussions (FGDs) were conducted in each area to ensure 
that the identified attributes from the literature were rel-
evant to the HHs and to identify new ones. We probed 
participants on factors that would influence them to join 
a health insurance plan. We asked them specific ques-
tions about the potentially relevant attributes that we 
had earlier identified from the literature review. Par-
ticipants were also asked to rank the attributes in order 
of importance. The FGDs were carried out by the first 
author with assistance from one research assistant in 
Luganda and English. We audio-recorded and later tran-
scribed the data verbatim. We then translated the tran-
scripts into English. We analyzed the data using both 
deductive and inductive thematic approaches. The main 
themes from the FGDs were related to premiums, pro-
viders of health services, unit of enrollment, and service 
benefits packages.
Premiums: The Ministry of Health (MoH) for Uganda 
proposed that self-employed individuals contribute UGX 
Initial literature review 
for identifying candidate
FGDs for identifying HH
relevant attributes




More than 20 attributes identified
Five attributes identified including 
premiums, enrollment, benefit package,
providers and copayment
Four policy and HH relevant attributes 
including premiums, enrollment, benefit 
package and providers
32 choice sets identified that were 
divided into 4 blocks for each area
were generated and pretested
Final data collection
Eligibility= HH head or spouse, 
age above 18years, stayed in 
Katanga or Kyebando for at least 6 
months, given consent to 
participate in the study
Excluded= Not meeting inclusion 
criteria, declined to participate, child 
headed HHs, No HH head/spouse at the 
time of the study
30 HHs administered block 1
30 HHs administered block 2
30 HHs administered block 3





Enrollment of HHs into 
study
Fig. 1 Study design
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100,000 (USD 26.7) (based on currency conversion rates 
from the OANDA website) [36] annually to the scheme, 
while salaried employees contribute 4% of their salary 
to the scheme [9]. The 4% is equivalent to UGX 68,000 
(USD 18.1) to UGX 450,000 per year (USD 120) (based 
on average income ranges from the Uganda national 
household survey 2016/2017) [36, 37]. The employers 
would then be required to provide an additional 1% of 
the employee’s salary (in addition to the 4% contribution 
by the employee) [5, 37]. From the FGDs, participants 
from the slum area suggested premiums that ranged from 
UGX 20,000 (USD 5.3) per year to UGX 100,000 (USD 
26.7) per year, while participants from the non-slum area 
suggested premiums that ranged from UGX 100,000 
(USD 26.7) per year to UGX 300,000 (USD 80.0) per 
year. Therefore, for this attribute, we included levels that 
ranged from UGX 20,000 per year to UGX 100,000 per 
year for the slum community and UGX 100,000 per year 
to UGX 300,000 per year for the non-slum community.
Providers: From the literature, this attribute was mainly 
categorized depending on the way the health systems 
from the countries where the studies originated were 
organized. In some countries like Iran and Thailand, 
there were no faith-based health care providers while in 
Africa, they were common [29, 30, 32, 33, 38]. The major-
ity of participants in the FGDs from both the slum and 
non-slum communities wanted to receive health services 
from both public and private health care providers, while 
a minority wanted to receive health services from private 
health care providers only. Therefore, for this attribute, 
we included the following levels: private health care pro-
viders only; both private and public health care providers 
and; public health care providers only. The private health 
care providers in our study included both private and 
faith-based health care providers.
Unit of enrollment: From the literature review, this 
attribute was categorized based on the type and number 
of family members the insurance plan is responsible for. 
For example, it was categorized by some researchers as 
self only, self plus spouse, self plus spouse plus children, 
and self plus extended family [29, 33, 34]. For the case of 
Uganda, the MoH proposed that the beneficiaries include 
the individual who pays for the health insurance plan, 
their spouse, and one of their children below the age of 
18 years [9]. From the FGDs, the majority of participants 
were not interested in any health insurance plan that did 
not cover extended family members. The Majority of par-
ticipants concerned with the depletion of resources sug-
gested a restriction on the number of children enrolled to 
three per HH. Therefore, for this attribute, we considered 
the following levels: restricted enrollment (parents and 
their three children); unrestricted enrollment (parents 
without limitations on the number of children enrolled) 
and; extended family enrollment (parents, their children, 
and grandparents).
Service benefits package: From the literature review, 
this attribute was categorized as follows: basic, medium, 
and comprehensive benefits packages [29, 30] and; inpa-
tient department services, outpatient department ser-
vices, and drugs and tests [33]. From the FGDs, the 
majority of participants from the slum area pointed out 
that they were disproportionately affected by all diseases 
and therefore wanted all health conditions to be covered 
by the health insurance scheme. Others wanted some 
limitations on the type of health conditions covered by 
the health insurance scheme to avoid reckless use and 
depletion of resources. Participants from the non-slum 
community were equally divided with some wanting all 
health conditions covered, while others wanted some 
restrictions on the type of health conditions that health 
insurance covers. Therefore, in our study, this attrib-
ute included the following levels: simple service benefits 
package; moderate service benefits package and; compre-
hensive service benefits package. These attribute levels 
are defined in Table 1.
Development of the DCE questionnaire
We used experimental design methods to derive choice 
sets. From the literature, two approaches are commonly 
used to design choice sets namely: orthogonal methods 
and D-optimal methods [39]. We used D-optimal meth-
ods because they perform better than orthogonal designs 
and require fewer choice sets and sample sizes com-
pared to orthogonal designs [26]. The generated designs 
had 32 choice sets that were organized into 4 blocks to 
reduce the cognitive burden on each respondent. Each 
HH head/spouse answered 9 choice sets that included a 
fixed choice question that was not part of the experimen-
tal design and was used to assess the predictive power of 
the models.
Before the final data collection, we pilot tested the 
questionnaires on a total of 30 HHs (15 HHs from each 
area) and made minor revisions to the questionnaires. 
The DCE questionnaire collected data on the character-
istics of the HHs, the choice sets, and the socio-economic 
status of the HHs.
Figure  2 shows an example of a choice set. The data 
collection tools were in English and Luganda (the most 
commonly spoken languages in the area).
Study population, sample size, study variables, sampling 
procedure, and data collection
We targeted HH heads/spouses in the Kawempe division 
of Kampala city who had stayed for at least 6 months in 
the area and were at least 18 years of age at the time of 
conducting this study. We left out child-headed HHs and 
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HHs whose heads/spouses refused to participate or were 
not available at the time of conducting the study.
We used Louviere et  al.’s [40] sample size calcula-
tor and determined that a minimum of 54 HHs were 
required for each area considering each HH head/
spouse answered 8 choice sets; the choice probability 
in the population was 0.5; the allowed deviation from 
the true population proportion was 0.1 and; the con-
fidence level was 95%. Considering that each version 
of the questionnaire is supposed to be answered by at 
least 30 HHs to avoid imprecise estimations during 
econometric analysis, the final sample size for each area 
was revised to 120 HHs such that each of the 4 ver-
sions of the questionnaire for each area was answered 
by at least 30 HHs [26]. The dependent variable was the 
choice of health insurance plan. The independent vari-
ables were the attributes. Table 2 shows all the variables 
that were measured and their description.
We used face-to-face interviews to collect the data. We 
purposively selected the Kyebando parish to represent the 
non-slum communities and the Katanga slum to represent 
the slum communities. We selected the Kyebando parish 
Table 1 Summary of attributes and levels
a 1 USD = 3750 UGX (April 2020 exchange rate)
b Public providers include health facilities that are owned by the government; private providers include health facilities that are owned by private individuals and 
faith-based organizations
c Restricted enrollment of children includes parents and only three children; unrestricted enrollment of children includes parents with no restrictions on the number 
of children and; the extended family includes children, their parents, and grandparents
d Simple service benefits package includes primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, ANC, family planning; moderate service benefits package includes chronic 
illnesses for example asthma, hypertension, and diabetes, major surgeries including caesarian sections and; comprehensive service benefits package includes cancers, 
advanced kidney diseases, heart surgeries, neurosurgeries, ICU, and special care units
Attribute Description Regression label Non-slum community Slum community
Levels Levels
Premiumsa The yearly cost of the health insur-
ance plan
Premiums 1. UGX 100,000 (USD 26.7)
2. UGX 200,000 (USD 53.3)
3. UGX 300,000 (USD 80.0)
1. UGX 20,000 (USD 5.3)
2. UGX 50,000 (USD 13.3)
3. UGX 100,000 (USD 26.7)
Providersb The kind of health providers from 





1. Private providers only
2. Public and private providers
3. Public providers
1. Private providers only
2. Public and private providers
3. Public providers
Enrollmentc The type and number of family 





1. Restricted enrollment of children 
to 3
2. Extended family
3.Unrestricted enrollment of 
children
1. Restricted enrollment of children 
to 3
2. Extended family




The type of health services covered 




1. Simple service benefits package
2. Moderate service benefits pack-
age
3. Comprehensive service benefits 
package
1. Simple service benefits package
2. Moderate service benefits package
3. Comprehensive service benefits 
package
Health insurance A Health insurance B
Premiums (UGX / year) 300,000 200,000
Unit of enrollment Restricted enrollment of 
children to 3
Unrestricted enrollment of 
children
Health Service package Comprehensive package Moderate package
Providers Public only Private only
Which one would you prefer?                    
Would you take it up or prefer things connue as they have been? Yes/no 
A B
Fig. 2 Example of a choice set
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to represent the non-slum communities because it has sev-
eral gated residential houses with perimeter walls which 
are not typical of slum communities [19]. We then applied 
systematic sampling in the selection of the HHs that par-
ticipated in the DCE from each area [41, 42]. We selected 
the reference HHs for each community randomly and 
thereafter interviewed every 29th HH in the slum commu-
nity and every 20th HH in the non-slum community. The 
HH intervals for each community were obtained by divid-
ing the estimates of the number of HHs in each area by the 
required sample sizes for each area. In case the approached 
HH did not meet the inclusion criteria, the next immedi-
ate HH would be approached and the process would be 
continued until the required sample size was obtained. The 
questionnaires from each block were distributed randomly 
to each of the interviewers daily. We edited the data in the 
field to ensure completeness and consistency.
Data analysis
We chose the HH as the unit of analysis because in our 
study setting, especially among poorer HHs, decisions on 
seeking health care are usually based on HHs rather than 
individuals [30]. We used Chi-square tests and t-tests to 
assess for differences between the slum and the non-slum 
communities that may influence their choice behavior. Sta-
tistical analysis of the DCE data was based on random util-
ity models. Random utility models are used to analyze the 
choices of individuals among discrete sets of alternatives.
Equation 1 shows the random utility model. According to 
the random utility theory, the utility that a HH (n) obtains 
from an insurance plan i is given by:
where U_in is the latent utility for an item i , V ( X_in,B ) 
is the systematic component which is a function of attrib-
utes x and marginal utility B . The total error term ( C_in) 
in mixed logit models is split into two parts. The first part 
µ_i is an individual-specific random effect that takes into 
account the panel nature of the data. The second part ε_n 
is an independent extreme value type-1 distributed part 
of the error such that the parameters can be estimated as 
a logit model [43, 44].
Equation 2 shows the form of the models.
where B represents the parameter mean and its stand-
ard deviation in the population. All regression labels are 
defined in Table 1.
(1)
U_(in) = V (x_in,B)+ C_in = V (x_in,B)+ µ_i + ε_n
(2)V (xin,B) = B0+B1premiums+B2Both+B3Private+B4simple+B5comprehensive+B6Restrict+B7Extended
Calculating willingness to pay
WTP and its confidence interval were calculated using 
the “wtp” command in STATA 14.2 software using the 
delta method. WTP was calculated after estimating the 
model in Eq. 2 with the premium attribute fixed [45].
Validity and predictive power of the models
Theoretical validity refers to the extent to which the 
results are consistent with the expectations [46, 47]. 
Theoretical validity was assessed by checking the direc-
tion of association for some of the parameters. For 
example, the premium attribute was expected to have 
a negative coefficient (because people do not want to 
pay more for the same thing). Content validity for a 
DCE refers to the extent to which the attributes and 
levels are relevant to the participants [46, 48]. Content 
validity was ensured through careful development of 
the questionnaire that involved a thorough literature 
review to guide the development of the FGD guide 
and conducting FGDs with HH heads/spouses such 
that the generated attributes and levels are relevant to 
the communities. We also conducted pilot tests of the 
questionnaire.
To assess the predictive power of the models, we 
included one fixed choice set for each area (which was 
not part of the experimental design) that was answered 
by all participants. The preference estimates from the 
choice sets that were part of the experimental design 
were then used to estimate the probability of choos-
ing one of the alternative health insurance plans in the 
fixed choice set.
Ethical considerations
The institutional review board of the School of Pub-
lic Health, Makerere University approved this study. 




Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the HHs that 
participated in this study. All participants who agreed 
to participate in this study completed the questionnaire. 
Overall, 240 HH heads/spouses were interviewed––120 
HH heads/spouses from the slum community and 120 
HH heads/spouses from the non-slum community. The 
majority of HHs were headed by males (70.4%), 65% 
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Table 2 Summary of variables
a Restricted enrollment of children includes parents and only three children. Unrestricted enrollment of children includes parents with no restrictions on the number 
of children.  The extended family includes children, their parents, and grandparents
b Simple service benefits package includes primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, ANC, and family planning; moderate service benefits package includes 
chronic illnesses for example asthma, hypertension, and diabetes, major surgeries including caesarian sections; comprehensive service benefits package includes 
cancers, advanced kidney disease, heart surgeries, neurosurgeries, ICU, and special care units
c Public providers include health facilities that are owned by the government; private providers include health facilities that are owned by private individuals and 
faith-based organization
Variables Description Measurement
Premiums The yearly cost for the health insurance plan in 
Ugandan shillings
Cost in Ugandan shillings
Enrollmenta The type of family members allowed by the 
health insurance plan
Restricted enrollment of children to 3 = 1
Unrestricted enrollment of children = 2
Extended family = 3
Service benefits  packageb The type of benefit packages the health insur-
ance plan offers
Simple benefits package = 1
Moderate benefits package = 2
Comprehensive benefits package = 3
Providersc The type of providers for the health services Public providers = 1
Private providers = 3
Both public and private = 2
Sex The biological sex of the HH head Male = 1, female = 0
Age The age of the HH head in completed years Age in completed years
Child categories The number of children in the HH in the follow-
ing categories
Below 5
Between 5 and 10
Between 10 and 19
Above 19
Pay health History of paying OOP for health care in public 
facilities or paying for health products/ser-
vices in private facilities because they were 
not available in public facilities
Yes = 1
No = 0




Living together or cohabiting = 6
Occupation The main occupation of the HH head Farmer = 1
Salaried = 2






Education level The highest level of education for the HH head No education = 1
Primary education = 2
Secondary education = 3
Post-secondary education = 4
Vocational education = 5
Possession of health insurance Any possession of health insurance by the HH Yes = 1
No = 0
Responsible organization The arrangement for payment of health insur-
ance by the HH
Private = 1
Employer based = 0




Chronic illness in HH Any member of the HH with chronic illness Yes = 1
No = 0
Socio-economic status The classification of HHs into socio-economic 
classes
The assets were modified from the Uganda demo-
graphic and health survey questionnaire [35]
By principle component analysis and wealth index calculation using HH assets. 
We considered assets that included ownership of a sofa set, sideboard, wall 
watch, house ownership, type of fuel for cooking, floor material, wall mate-
rial, source of drinking, type of toilet facility, sharing of toilet facility, number 
of rooms for sleeping, ownership of a bike, ownership of a motorcycle, 
ownership of a car, ownership of a bank account, number of transactions
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had at most three children, 88.7% reported paying for 
health services in public health care facilities, 94.0% 
were not insured, and 33.6% had at least one fam-
ily member with a chronic illness. Also, 67.9% of HH 
heads were either married or living with a partner and 
66.7% had attained at least a senior 4 level of education 
(equivalent to grade 11 in the United States of America 
education system) [49].
Compared with the slum community, the non-slum 
community: had more HHs with more than three chil-
dren (43.3% non-slum versus 26.7% slum, p < 0.001); had 
more HH heads with at least a senior 4 level of educa-
tion (40.8% non-slum versus 26.7% slum, p < 0.001) and; 
had more HH heads who were self-employed (45.8% 
non-slum versus 35.8% slum, p < 0.001). In terms of 
socio-economic position, the non-slum community had 
more HHs in the richest quartile (40.0% non-slum versus 
10.0% slum, p < 0.001), and had HH heads who were on 
average earning UGX 248,125 (USD 66.2) (based on cur-
rency conversion rates from the OANDA website) [36] 
per month more than their slum counterparts (p < 0.001). 
In terms of presence in the HH of family members with 
chronic illnesses, the slum community had more HHs 
with members suffering from chronic illnesses compared 
with the non-slum community (37.5% slum versus 30.0% 
non-slum, p < 0.001).
Preferences of health insurance attributes
Tables  4 summarizes HH preferences for the non-slum 
and slum communities. Two main effects models were fit 
to the data: one for the slum community; and the other 
for the non-slum community. Two models were fit to the 
data because of differences between the two communi-
ties in terms of characteristics that can influence choice 
behavior that included: HH characteristics, socioeco-
nomic position, and presence in the HH of members with 
chronic illnesses. Additionally, the two sampled commu-
nities generated different levels for the premium attrib-
ute with the non-slum community suggesting higher 
premiums.
HHs in the non-slum community had a high preference 
for health insurance plans that allowed extended family 
enrollment (parents, their biological children, and grand-
parents) (β = 0.44, P < 0.05) as compared to plans that 
allowed an unrestricted enrollment of children (parents 
plus any number of their children) and; health insurance 
plans in which they could receive health care from both 
private and public health care providers as compared to 
plans in which they could receive health care from pub-
lic health care providers only (β = 0.81, P < 0.05). HHs in 
the non-slum community had a low preference for health 
insurance plans that had a simple service benefits pack-
age (primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, ANC, 
and family planning) as compared to plans that had a 
moderate benefits package (chronic illnesses and major 
surgeries) (β = − 0.97, P < 0.05) and; health insurance 
plans that allowed a restricted enrollment of children 
(parents plus 3 children only) as compared to plans that 
allowed an unrestricted enrollment of children (β =  − 
0.90, P < 0.05).
HHs in the slum community had a low preference 
for health insurance plans that allowed a restricted 
enrollment of children (parents plus 3 children only) 
(β = − 0.32, p < 0.05) but had a high preference for plans 
that allowed extended family enrollment (parents, grand-
parents, and biological children) as compared to plans 
that allowed an unrestricted enrollment of children 
(parents plus any number of their children) (β = 0.36, 
p < 0.05). HHs in the slum community also had a high 
preference for health insurance plans in which they could 
receive health care from both private and public health 
care providers as compared to plans in which they could 
receive health care from public health care providers only 
(β = 0.87, p < 0.05).
The significant standard deviations for the coefficients 
of the attributes show that the parameters vary in the 
population and there is preference heterogeneity among 
respondents for the health insurance attributes (a possi-
ble indication of unmeasured variables influencing pref-
erence estimates such as taste differences) [50, 51]. The 
premium attribute was modeled as a fixed parameter to 
more easily calculate WTP [28].
Willingness to pay
Table 5 summarizes WTP estimates for the slum and 
the non-slum communities. HHs in the non-slum 
community were on average willing to pay: UGX 
206,960 (USD 55.2) (based on currency conversion 
rates from the OANDA website) [36] per year for a 
plan that allowed extended family enrollment rather 
than one that allowed an unrestricted enrollment 
of children; UGX 418,932 (USD 111.7) per year for 
a plan that allowed an unrestricted enrollment of 
children rather than one that allowed a restricted 
enrollment of children; UGX 454,727 (USD 121.3) 
per year for a plan with a moderate service benefits 
package rather than one with a simple service ben-
efits package and; UGX 377,057 (USD 100.5) per year 
to receive health care from both private and public 
health care providers rather than public health care 
providers only.
HHs in the slum community were on average willing 
to pay: UGX 36,540 (USD 9.7) per year for a plan that 
allowed an unrestricted enrollment of children rather 
than one that allowed a restricted enrollment of chil-
dren; UGX 40,937 (USD 10.9) per year for a plan that 
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Table 3 Characteristics of households that participated in the discrete choice experiment
P values for categorical values were based on chi-squared tests while for continuous variables, it was based on t-tests
Private facilities include facilities owned by private individuals and organizations and faith-based organizations
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, Where asterisks do not exist, there was no statistically significant difference in the variable identified
Variable Slum community Non-slum area community Total
Frequency (percentage) Frequency (percentage) Frequency (percentage)
Sex
 Female 34 (28.3) 37 (30.8) 71 (29.6)
 Male 86 (71.7) 83 (69.2) 169 (70.4)
Age Mean 32.49 (SD 8.2) Mean 37.29 (SD = 10.6)*** Mean = 34.89 (SD = 9.8)
Marriage status
 Married 79 (65.8) 84 (70.0) 163 (67.9)
 Not married 41 (34.2) 36 (30.0) 77 (32.1)
Number of HH with children
 0–3 88 (73.3) 68 (56.7) 156 (65.0)
 > 3 32 (26.7) 52 (43.3)*** 84 (35.0)
History of paying for health in government facilities
 Yes 107 (89.2) 106 (88.3) 212 (88.3)
 No 13 (10.8) 14 (11.7) 28 (11.7)
Education level
 No education 5 (4.2) 5 (4.2) 10 (4.2)
 Primary education 44 (36.7) 24 (20.0) 68 (28.3)
 Senior 4 32 (26.7) 49 (40.8) 81 (33.8)
 Senior 6 21 (17.5) 21 (17.5) 42 (17.5)
 University 13 (10.8) 16 (13.3) 29 (12.1)
 Vocational institute 5 (4.2) 5 (4.2)*** 10 (4.2)
Occupation
 Salaried employee 38 (31.7) 39 (32.5) 77 (32.1)
 Casual worker 17 (14.2) 14 (11.7) 31 (12.9)
 Self-employed 43 (35.8) 55 (45.8) 98 (40.8)
 Unemployed 18 (15.0) 7 (5.8) 25 (10.4)
 Others 84(72.0) 85(70.8)*** 169 (70.4)
HH income per month Mean 367,625 (SD 269,622.7) Mean 615,750 (SD 645,989)*** Mean 491,687.5(SD = 510,226.2)
HH income per month categories (UGX)
 0–200,000 42 (35.0) 14 (11.7) 22 (9.2)
 200,001–400,000 44 (36.7) 41 (34.2) 85 (35.4)
 400,001–600,000 19 (15.8) 32 (26.7) 51 (21.3)
 > 600,001 15 (12.5) 33 (27.5)**** 48 (20.0)
Possession of health insurance
 Yes 8 (6.7) 7 (5.9) 16 (6.7)
 No 112 (93.3) 113 (94.1) 224 (93.3)
The usual source of health care
 Public facilities 58 (48.3) 46 (38.3) 104 (43.3)
 Private facilities 62 (51.7) 74 (61.7)*** 136 (56.7)
Chronic illness in HH
 Yes 45 (37.5) 36 (30.0) 81 (33.8)
 No 75 (62.5) 84 (70.0)*** 159 (66.2)
Socio-economic status
 Quantile 1 44 (37.7) 16 (13.3) 60 (25.0)
 Quantile 2 36 (30.0) 24 (20.0) 60 (25.0)
 Quantile 3 28 (23.3) 32 (26.7) 60 (25.0)
 Quantile 4 12 (10.0) 48 (40.0)**** 60 (25.0)
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allowed extended family enrollment rather one that 
allowed an unrestricted enrollment of children and; 
UGX 98,738 (USD 26.3) to receive health care from 
both private and public health care providers rather 
than public health care providers only.
Assessing the validity of the results and predictive power 
of the models
Most of the estimated coefficients including the coeffi-
cient for the premium attribute had the expected signs. 
The model for the non-slum community predicted that 
66.1% of the HH heads from the non-slum community 
would choose health insurance A of the fixed choice 
question. From the data collected, 64.2% of the HHs in 
the non-slum community chose health insurance A of 
the fixed choice question. The model for the slum com-
munity predicted that 54.5% of the HHs from the slum 
community would choose health insurance A of the 
fixed choice question. From the data collected, 54.2% 
of the HHs from the slum community chose health 
insurance A of the fixed choice question. These results 
show that both models had good prediction.
Discussion
We present data of HH preferences and WTP for health 
insurance in the Kawempe division of Kampala city 
stratified into slum and non-slum communities. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study from Uganda that has 
examined preferences for health insurance attributes 
and their valuation by HHs. We found differences in HH 
characteristics between slum and non-slum communi-
ties, which may influence their health access choices that 
ultimately affect their choice of health insurance plans. 
Although we found differences between the two com-
munities in terms of preferences for the service benefits 
package, some similarities were identified. For instance, 
we found that HHs in both communities preferred health 
insurance plans that have fewer restrictions on the num-
ber of family members allowed and health insurance 
Table 4 Household preferences for health insurance attributes
The non-significant constant suggests that there is no left–right bias in the data. This means that respondents were not likely to choose the left than the right 
alternative
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
a Restricted enrollment of children includes parents and only three children; unrestricted enrollment of children includes parents with no restrictions on the number 
of children and; the extended family includes children, their parents, and grandparents
b Simple service benefits package includes primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, ANC, and family planning; moderate service benefits package includes 
chronic illnesses (asthma, hypertension, and diabetes) and major surgeries including caesarian sections; comprehensive service benefits package includes cancers, 
advanced kidney disease, heart surgeries, neurosurgeries, ICU, and special care units
c Public providers include health facilities that are owned by the government; private providers include health facilities that are owned by private individuals and 
faith-based organizations
Attribute Non-slum community Slum community
Mean (Standard error) SD (Standard error) Mean (Standard error) SD (Standard error)
Premium (continuous*10,000 UGX /year) − 0.21 (0.08)** − 0.88 (0.18)***
Enrollmenta
 Extended family 0.44 (0.20)** 1.39 (0.26)*** 0.36 (0.14)** 0.09 (0.60)
 Restricted enrollment of children to 3 (Ref: 
unrestricted enrollment of children)
− 0.90 (0.16)*** 0.70 (0.24)* − 0.32 (0.17)* 1.00 (0.47)
Service benefits  packageb
 Simple − 0.97 (0.22)*** 1.62 (0.25)*** 0.10 (0.29) 0.63 (0.30)
 Comprehensive (Ref: moderate) − 0.02 (0.14) 0.50 (0.29) − 0.14 (0.18) 1.30 (0.23)***
Providersc
 Private only − 0.08 (0.14) 0.46 (0.29) − 0.06 (0.16) 0.92 (0.21)***
 Private and public (Ref: Public) 0.81 (0.18)*** 0.95 (0.24)** 0.87 (0.17)*** 0.96 (0.22)***
Constant 0.02 (0.11) 0.09 (0.10)
Model diagnostics
 Number of respondents 120 120
 Number of observations 1920 1920
 Loglikelihood − 553.00 − 581.61
 Loglikelihood X^2 88.57 70.94
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plans in which they can receive health care from both 
private and public health care providers.
HHs in both communities preferred health insurance 
plans that allow extended family enrollment. In Africa, 
most families are extended families. Therefore, plans 
that allow extended family enrollment are expected to be 
preferred as has been indicated in other studies [16, 33, 
34]. However, one study that was conducted in Ethiopia 
had different results with HHs preferring limited family 
enrollment [33]. The authors found these results surpris-
ing but contend that the respondents may have attached 
costs to enrolling extended family members, or the cost 
of health care for their parents may have been shared 
among siblings. Thus, some of the interviewed par-
ticipants may not have been directly responsible for the 
health of their parents [33]. Contrary to our expectations, 
HHs in the slum community had a similar preference for 
health insurance plans that allow a restricted enrollment 
of children and plans that allow an unrestricted enroll-
ment of children: this may have been because HHs in 
the slum community had fewer children compared with 
those in the non-slum community. The greater number of 
children in the HHs from the non-slum community com-
pared with the slum community was also not expected. A 
possible explanation for this finding could be due to the 
HH heads in the slum community being younger and as 
their families grow, and possibly their finances improve, 
they move out of the slum communities. Including more 
HH members in the NHIS would be attractive for the 
majority of HHs in both communities but this needs to 
be weighed against the other attributes and the possible 
depletion of resources because of increased demand.
Regarding the service benefits package, HHs in the 
non-slum community had a high preference for health 
insurance plans that had a moderate service benefits 
package (chronic illnesses and major surgeries) as com-
pared to plans that had either a simple service benefits 
package (primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, 
ANC, and family planning) or; a comprehensive service 
benefits package (cancers, kidney disease, heart surgeries, 
neurosurgeries, ICU, and special care units). As indicated 
in other studies, the preference for the service benefits 
packages depends on the community’s perceptions about 
the costs and the seriousness of the health conditions 
covered by health insurance [30, 52], For instance, in our 
study, the health conditions under the moderate benefits 
package are often perceived to be more serious and more 
costly compared with health conditions under the sim-
ple benefits package. For the case of the comprehensive 
benefits package, the health conditions covered may have 
been perceived by the HHs to be rare and therefore not 
a priority to insure against (possibly because few family 
members are likely to require management for them). 
Our results agree with findings from other DCEs in 
Table 5 Willingness to pay
a Restricted enrollment of children includes parents and only three children; unrestricted enrollment of children includes parents with no restrictions on the number 
of children and; the extended family includes children, their parents, and grandparents
b Simple service benefits package includes primary health care diseases, minor surgeries, ANC, and family planning; moderate service benefits package includes 
chronic illnesses (asthma, hypertension, and diabetes) and major surgeries including caesarian sections; comprehensive service benefits package includes cancers, 
advanced kidney disease, heart surgeries, neurosurgeries, ICU, and special care units
c Public providers include health facilities that are owned by the government; private providers include health facilities that are owned by private individuals and 
faith-based organizations
Attributes Non-slum community Slum community
WTP (95% CI) WTP (95% CI)
Premium
(continuous*UGX 100,000 per year)
Enrollmenta
 Restricted enrollment of children to 3
 Extended family − 4.19 (− 7.33, − 1.05) − 0.37 (− 0.76, 0.03)
 (Ref: unrestricted enrollment of children) 2.07 (− 0.23, 4.37) 0.41 (0.05, 0.77)
Service benefits  packageb
 Simple
 Comprehensive − 4.55 (− 8.26, 0.84) 0.12 (− 0.21, 0.45)
 (Ref: moderate) − 0.09 (− 1.39, 1.22) − 0.15 (− 0.57, 0.26)
Providersc
 Private and public
 Private only 3.77 (0.79, 6.75) 0.99 (0.49, 1.48)
 (Ref: Public) 0.38 (− 0.95, 1.71) − 0.07 (− 0.42, 0.29)
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which coverage for major surgeries and chronic illnesses 
was important for the respondents [16, 30]. In contrast, 
HH from the slum community equally preferred all forms 
of the service benefits packages. This may be explained 
by the fact that slum communities are disproportion-
ately affected by most diseases compared with the rest of 
the communities and therefore, it was hard for them to 
decide on the best benefits package. Therefore, the MoH 
may need to modify the scheme for poor communities.
Furthermore, HHs in both communities preferred 
plans in which they can receive health care from both 
private and public health care providers. These findings 
agree with several other studies that found that, given 
the opportunity, individuals prefer to receive health care 
from both private and public healthcare providers [33, 
38]. The preference for both providers in our study is 
complex because of the various health system issues. For 
instance, on one hand, the public is aware of the public 
health facilities’ challenges such as health worker absen-
teeism, low staffing, frequent breakdown of equipment 
due to poor maintenance, and unavailability of drugs. 
On the other hand, the public health care facilities, par-
ticularly the referral hospitals, are known to have better 
infrastructure and more qualified staff [53, 54]. The pref-
erence for both providers may also be explained by the 
HH’s concerns about the profit-making motives of private 
health care providers that may compromise their services 
[35, 54]. Therefore, the MoH may need to contract with 
some private providers in addition to public providers in 
NHIS to make the scheme more attractive and acceptable 
for the majority of HHs.
Our study shows that HHs in the non-slum commu-
nity are willing to pay more for the preferred attributes 
compared with their counterparts in the slum com-
munity. This is not surprising and can be explained by 
a higher income and awareness level of the benefits of 
health insurance in the non-slum community compared 
with the slum community [30, 52]. For instance, in our 
study, the non-slum community had more HH heads 
who had attained at least a Senior 4 level of education 
(equivalent to grade 11 in the United States of America 
education system) [49] compared with the slum com-
munity. The higher education attainment by HH heads in 
the non-slum community may have helped them to earn 
more income and have a higher level of awareness for the 
benefits of health insurance [30]. As indicated in other 
studies, the higher the level of education, the greater the 
WTP for health insurance [13, 52].
This study also assessed the validity of the estimated 
models and found that most of the coefficients including 
the premium attribute had the expected signs. The pre-
mium attribute had a negative sign in both models which 
shows that as the premiums increased, the preferences 
for health insurance plans decreased [16]. This adds to 
the theoretical validity of the results.
Strengths and limitations of this study
The strength of this study––based on the design––is that 
DCEs not only estimate HH preferences for the attrib-
utes of health insurance, but can also be used to estimate 
valuation of the attributes, and thus, are not as limited as 
contingent methods that can estimate WTP for health 
insurance but not attributes’ preferences.
The limitation of this study––based on the study 
design––is that the respondents may face challenges in 
answering the multiple questions that require tradeoffs 
characteristic of DCEs.
In terms of generalizability, our findings may apply 
to Kampala city because the residents of Kampala are 
mainly divided into the slum and non-slum dwellers. 
However, these results may also apply to other urban 
populations of Uganda with similar contexts as Kampala. 
The results from the slum community may also reflect 
rural preferences and willingness to pay since most of the 
slum dwellers are usually immigrants from rural commu-
nities [55, 56].
Conclusions and recommendations
Our study reveals that HHs in the slum and the 
non-slum communities prefer and value plans that 
include both private and public health care provid-
ers. Therefore, for the type of health care providers 
to be included in the NHIS, we recommend that the 
MoH considers contracting with some private health 
care providers to make the scheme more attractive 
and acceptable for the majority of HHs. Although 
findings from our study suggest that more HHs may 
join the NHIS if more family members are allowed, 
this needs to be weighed against possible depletion of 
resources. For the service benefits package to include 
in the NHIS, we advise the MoH to prioritize provid-
ing coverage for chronic illnesses and major surgeries 
especially for the non-slum communities rather than 
prioritizing specialized care units. We recommend 
that the MoH subsidizes the scheme for the poor 
communities (slum and rural) to make the scheme 
affordable for the poor while at the same time set rea-
sonable premiums for the non-slum communities to 
raise adequate funds for the health sector.
Further research may be needed targeting specifically 
people who work in the formal sector and the richest 
class to provide information about these groups’ pref-
erences and WTP. Qualitative research targeting poli-
cymakers in the MoH, the health workers, the district 
health teams and, the legislators may also be needed 
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to get their perspectives on how the health insurance 
scheme should be designed.
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